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The quantity of salt applied to roadways has enormous impact on water quality; not so on municipal liability. Pennsylvania courts have clearly affirmed that the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act protects local government units from allegations that they did not do enough to treat roads for ice resulting from wintery weather.
The amount of road salt applied to roadways in the United States has escalated for decades, doubling since 1975 to an estimated 15-32 million metric tons every year.[1] This salt doesn’t stay on the road. It eventually makes its way into soil, groundwater, and rivers, lakes, and streams, impairing drinking water quality,[2] and wreaking havoc on aquatic[3] and other plant and animal life.[4] The Stroud Water Research Center reports that these harms aren’t just seasonal: elevated salinity stemming from winter road treatments has been documented in Pennsylvania streams year-round.[5] In some stream sections, researchers have found water during peak treatment season to be as salty the ocean.[6] The effects are also cumulative: chloride does not biodegrade, and there are no known methods to remove it from the environment.[7] Road salt creates other public expenses as well—shortening the life of public infrastructure—effectively siphoning public works dollars from other worthy projects.[8]
Informal polling has identified legal liability concerns as a paramount reason for excessive road salting.[9] This suggests a common belief that liberally salting roads protects a municipality from legal claims that the municipality should have done more to prevent accidents during icy conditions. Courts have been clear about the reason this concern lacks merit: municipalities are generally immune from allegations that their efforts to clear snow and treat road surfaces were insufficient.
In 2011, a Philadelphia motorist was seriously injured when he lost control of his car on black ice.[10] He filed suit against the City (and the Commonwealth), alleging that negligent road management by the City had created the icy conditions that led to his injuries. A professional engineer testified that the black ice was “consistent with a failure of the City to apply uniformly and effectively salt to the roadway.”[11] That testimony never made it to a jury. The court summarily dismissed the suit, holding that the City was fully immune from allegations about the sufficiency of its salting practices—a result of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (the “PSTCA”).[12] The Commonwealth Court affirmed dismissal on appeal.
The PSTCA operates by providing blanket immunity to all “local agencies”—government units other than the Commonwealth itself (which is separately and similarly protected by the Sovereign Immunity Act[13]) —with limited, specifically enumerated exceptions for certain types of negligence. Before listing those exceptions, the act imposes a key threshold requirement: the plaintiff must prove the existence of a statutory or common law duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant.[14] For purposes of this guide, the critical upshot of this provision is that a plaintiff cannot assert that a municipality was negligent in its failure to do something, even within one of the act’s enumerated exceptions, unless they can first demonstrate that the municipality had a recognized legal duty to do that thing in the first place.
Next, a claim must satisfy one of the nine enumerated PSTCA exceptions.[15] The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the exceptions are to be narrowly construed in favor of protecting local governments from liability.[16] Only one exception, Section 8542(6), is directly relevant for claims alleging mismanagement of streets (the “streets exception”). The streets exception allows liability in connection with a “dangerous condition of” municipally owned roadways (or state roads where the municipality has contractual maintenance obligations).
At first glance, one might assume, as many have, that the streets exception exposes municipalities to claims that their winter management practices fell below acceptable standards. This is not the case for three primary reasons.
First, there is the threshold question of whether a common law or statutory duty exists. Courts have repeatedly dismissed snow- and ice-related claims against governments on the basis that, as a matter of law, municipalities have no common law duty to address natural conditions on public roadways, and that snow and ice resulting from natural weather patterns are precisely that kind of “natural” condition.[17] Municipalities have good reason to make roads navigable and safe, but the absence of a common law duty to do so is settled law.
Second, courts have repeatedly held that the act of removing snow or treating ice does not change the character of the snow or ice from “natural” to “artificial.”[18] If it did, the result would be absurd: opening and treating roads would expose governments to greater risk than if they did nothing at all.[19]
Third, the streets exception has been interpreted to only allow claims alleging a defect in the design, construction, or maintenance of the street itself, not something laying on its surface.[20] That is, plaintiff’s harms must be attributable to the condition of the street, as opposed to a condition on the street.
In Page (the first case referenced above), the Commonwealth Court reviewed each of these aspects, affirming dismissal both because of the lack of a common law duty to remove snow and ice (which disqualifies the claim under the PSTCA threshold provisions), and further, because there was no allegation that the street itself was to blame for the incident. Accordingly, municipalities are shielded from allegations that the action they took to clear snow and ice were not good enough. A claim based solely on the sufficiency of a municipality’s efforts to treat ice resulting from winter weather cannot evade PSTCA immunity.
The immunity described above does not mean municipalities are immune from every conceivable claim involving ice. Tangentially related liability concepts are addressed and distinguished below.
A claim that municipal property (streets, sidewalks, pipes, buildings, etc.) is itself the source of a dangerous icy condition, as opposed to the broad general effects of winter weather, has better—but far from certain—chances of surviving dismissal under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act. The risk of property-based claims—whether or not involving ice—can be curtailed with active risk management, in other words, addressing troubling property matters promptly when they arise. In any case, such risk does not undermine immunity for road treatment efforts and methods.
Consider a scenario where a ruptured pipe floods a frozen street creating an icy condition, injuring a motorist. Historically, Pennsylvania courts have acknowledged that a municipality may have a common-law duty to remove ice resulting from an artificial source.[21] However, under the PSTCA, the existence of a common law duty is just the first step; the plaintiff must still identify a relevant exception to immunity. For the reasons discussed above, the streets exception may be of no use, absent an allegation that that a defective design of the street contributed to the condition. A plaintiff might try instead to assert that the “dangerous condition” was the ruptured pipe itself, aiming for the “utility service facilities” exception to PSTCA immunity. A judge will likely conclude that any negligence leading to the leak is too far removed (not the proximate cause) of the ice-related injury, and dismiss the claim, or it could let the case proceed to a jury. However, even if the case proceeds, the plaintiff faces an uphill battle. PSTCA exceptions for streets, sidewalks, utility facilities, and traffic controls all require a plaintiff to prove that the municipality had notice of the dangerous condition that the injury was a foreseeable result of the condition, and that the municipality had sufficient time to take corrective action and failed to do so.[22] The act provides that the “amount of time reasonably required to take protective measures” is determined with reference to the resources actually available to the municipality at the time of the incident.[23] And further, even if the plaintiff prevails, the Act provides tremendous additional protection, limiting recoverable damages to $500,000, further reduced by any insurance proceeds received by plaintiff.[24]
While there are no reported ice cases on point, the Court’s discussion in Page suggests that claims might at least survive dismissal if they credibly allege that an icy condition resulted not from snow removal activities, but from the improper design, construction, or maintenance of the street itself.[25] If a street is negligently designed or constructed in a way that makes it likely and foreseeable that unusual and dangerous icy conditions will occur under ordinary weather patterns, a plaintiff might survive PSTCA dismissal by alleging that the street itself is the cause of the dangerous condition. For example, a negligently designed roadway that creates a recurrent ponding condition.
One PSTCA exception allows claims of negligence in the “care, custody or control of real property in the possession of the local agency.” Streets (among the other types of government property with their own, separate exceptions) are specifically excluded from the definition of real property. Courts have interpreted this language (“care, custody or control”) to be substantially broader than the language used in the streets exception; allowing claims related to government actions affecting the property, not just conditions of the property itself. In at least one case, Kilgore v. City of Philadelphia, this distinction exposed a city to liability for failure to remove snow from an airport roadway after an airport worker was injured.[26] Because the Kilgore court did not directly address the distinction between the airport roadway (which was “public” only in the sense that a government body owned it) and public streets, plaintiffs have attempted to cite the case to expand government liability for snow and ice on streets. Pennsylvania courts have faithfully rebuffed those efforts.[27] Elsewhere, courts have defined “street” as “a thoroughfare . . . reserved for vehicles,” and “used for travel in an urban area,” and “an unobstructed way open to the public.”[28]
In the case Commonwealth v. Weller, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation was held liable when it plowed snow in a manner that created an enormous “ramp” condition over a guardrail, which vaulted a motorist to his death.[29] The court concluded that the creation of the ramp was sufficient to transform the snow from a “natural” to an “artificial condition.” Notably, in the nearly thirty years since Weller was decided, no other appellate court has followed its reasoning in crediting an “artificial condition” created from natural snowfall—and it is unlikely that any court would reach the same result today given the intervening decisions interpreting the PSTCA. In particular, even if snow or ice is converted to an “artificial,” condition, a claim will still fail unless the condition is attributable to the street itself.[30] In at least one case, Uram v. City of Lancaster, a plaintiff succeeded in arguing that snow had been plowed into a pile that mirrored the “artificial condition” in Weller, but the case was still dismissed based on the failure to allege that the street itself was to blame for the injury.[31]
In 2018, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed itself to expand the meaning of a PSTCA exception applicable to the operation of government-owned vehicles. Section 8542(b)(1) relates to “[t]he operation of any motor vehicle in the possession or control of the local agency . . .” For decades, the Supreme Court had interpreted this provision to relate to government-owned vehicles in motion.[32] In the case Balentine v. Chester Water Authority, the Supreme Court held that “operating” a vehicle includes a broader spectrum of activities beyond driving. There, a government employee parked an agency vehicle along a roadway. Another vehicle struck it and propelled it into a worker, causing his death. The court reasoned that the decision of where to park the vehicle qualified as “operation” of the vehicle, even though the vehicle was not in motion when the incident occurred.[33] Following Balentine, the Commonwealth Court in Podejko v. Department of Transportation further expanded the vehicular exception to hold that operation of a vehicle includes the operation of equipment attached to government-owned vehicles. There, a fire crew damaged private property by negligently directing outflow when pumping water from a flooded roadway.[34]
This evolution has undeniably increased exposures related to the operation of government vehicles performing various functions, which might reasonably include winter maintenance. However, these risks relate specifically to instances where the operation of equipment causes harm (misfeasance), as distinguished from inadequate performance of a task that a municipality had no common law duty to do in the first place (nonfeasance). For example, if a municipal vehicle deposits an unreasonable mound of salt that causes a vehicle to crash, or discharges salt or brine directly onto people or property causing injury, the resulting claims might survive dismissal under the reasoning of Balentine and Podejko. The common law duty threshold issue (explained above) is likely satisfied because every individual operating vehicles and equipment has a duty to operate them with reasonable care. However, the expanded vehicular exception is unlikely to affect liability for (i) decisions about when and by what means to treat natural accumulations of ice and snow; or (ii) claims that negligent operation of government-owned vehicles resulted in insufficient treatment of icy conditions resulting from natural weather patterns. Framing these claims as vehicular negligence does not resolve the threshold issue: that the municipality had no common law duty to resolve winter road conditions in the first place.[35] Another interesting (if theoretical) consequence of the expanded vehicular exception is the enhanced risk of liability associated with over-salting. An individual alleging damage to their person or property resulting from the road salt itself might seek to assert that the application of salt in excessive volumes constituted negligent operation of government-owned vehicles within the meaning of Balentine and Podejko, evading PSTCA immunity in a way that would have been likely impossible under prior caselaw.
No action taken in the real world is without risk. However, for municipalities reviewing and revising their winter road management practices, the PSTCA, as interpreted and applied by Pennsylvania’s courts, allows municipalities to act with confidence: municipalities are generally immune from allegations that their efforts to clear snow and treat road surfaces were insufficient. Liability concerns need not be a barrier to municipalities reducing road salt application and reaping the benefits of cost-savings, extended infrastructure lifespans, improved water quality, and healthier environment.
[1] Susan Phillips, Road Salt Remains in Pa. N.J. and Del. Waterways Months After Winter Storms, According to New Data, WHYY (Dec. 16, 2025), https://whyy.org/articles/road-salt-remains-waterways-winter-storms/.
[2] See Phillips (“Of more than 700 locations sampled . . . [s]ixty percent of samples blew past the accepted healthy drinking water standard for those on a low-salt diet of 50 milligrams per liter.”). Pieper et al., Impact of Road Salt on Drinking Water Quality and Infrastructure Corrosion in Private Wells, 52 Env. Sci. & Tech. 14078 (2018).
[3] Environmental Hazards of Road Salt, PennState Extension (Oct. 27, 2023), https://extension.psu.edu/environmental-hazards-of-road-salt.
[4] Tiwari & Rachlin, A Review of Salt Ecological Impacts, 25 Northeastern Naturalist 123 (2018).
[5] Road Salt and Fresh Water, Stroud Water Research Center (accessed June 15, 2026), https://stroudcenter.org/salt/.
[6] Id.
[7] Effects of Deicing Materials on Natural Resources, Vehicles, and Highway Infrastructure, MICH. DEP’T. OF TRANSP., at 33 (Dec. 1993).
[8] Shi, et al., Corrosion of Deicers to Metals in Transportation Infrastructure: Introduction and Recent Developments, 27 Corrosion Reviews 23-52 (2009).
[9] Data provided by the Delaware River Basin Commission.
[10] Page v. City of Philadelphia, 25 A.3d 471 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 2011).
[11] Page at 474.
[12] 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541-8542
[13] The Sovereign Immunity Act is codified at 42 PA.C.S. §§ 8521-8528.
[14] Talarico v. Bonham, 650 A.2d 1192, 1194 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994).
[15] The exceptions listed at § 8542(b) are (1) operation of vehicles, (2) governmental custody of personal property, (3) real property (excluding trees, traffic controls, utilities, streets, and sidewalks), (4) trees, traffic controls, and street lights, (5) utilities, (6) streets, (7) sidewalks, (8) animals, and (9) sexual abuse.
[16] Mascaro v. Youth Study Ctr., 523 A.2d 118, 1123 (Pa. 1987).
[17] See Page; Walinsky v. St. Nicholas Ukrainian Catholic Church, 740 A.2d 318 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1999).
[18] Vitelli v. City of Chester, 545 A.2d 1011 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1988) (“[s]hoveled snow is a natural incident of the snowfall which cannot be separated from the snowfall itself. The fact that snow has been shoveled into the street does not change its character from ‘natural’ to ‘artificial’”.)
[19] Miller v. Kistler, 582 A.2d 416, 418 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1990) (“we hold that any improper plowing . . . did not create an artificial condition for which [defendant] can be held liable. A contrary conclusion would allow [defendant] to avoid liability for leaving roads unplowed but expose [defendant] to liability whenever it attempts to clear these same roads.”).
[20] See Page at 480 (“[plaintiff] failed to prove that black ice derived or originated from, or had as its source Allegheny Avenue itself . . . [t]herefore, we cannot conclude that an exception to governmental immunity through [the streets exception] of the [PSTCA] was applicable to the City.”)
[21] Keiser v. Philadelphia Transp. Co. 51 A.2d 715 (Pa. 1946); Fritzky v. Pittsburgh, 16 A. 2d 422 (Pa. 1940). These old common law cases, which predate the PSTCA, signal the possibility of municipal liability for ice resulting from leaking municipal improvements.
[22] PSTCA § 8542(b)(6) and (c).
[23] PSTCA § 8542(c).
[24] PSTCA § 8553.
[25] See Page. See also Cohen v. City of Phila, 874 A.2d 778 (Pa. Comm Ct. 2004) (interpreting the substantially similar PSTCA exception for sidewalks).
[26] Kilgore v. City of Philadelphia, 679 A.2d 231 (Pa. 1996).
[27] Jones v. SEPTA, 772 A.2d 435 (Pa. 2001).
[28] Gabra v. Borough of Prospect Park,
[29] Commonwealth, DOT v. Weller 574 A.2d 728 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1990).
[30] Uram v. City of Lancaster, 2013 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 13132 (Ct. Comm. Pls. Lancaster Cnty. 2013).
[31] Id.
[32]Love v. Philadelphia, 543 A.2d 531 (Pa. 1987) (“to operate something means to actually put it in motion. Merely preparing to operate a vehicle, or acts taken at the cessation of operating a vehicle are not the same as actually operating that vehicle.”). See the principle applied in City of Philadelphia v. Melendez, 627 A.2d 234 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1993)
[33] Balentine v. Chester Water Authority, 191 A.3d 799 (Pa. 2018).
[34] Podejko v. Department of Transportation, 236 A.3d 1216 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 2020).
[35] See Page; Walinsky.
